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1. Introduction 
The importance of cross-market linkages and spillovers between international stock 
markets is well established. The literature on this issue allows to draw at least two main 
conclusions. First, the empirical studies find that the US stock market is the dominant capital 
market influencing other mature and developing stock markets (Eun and Shim (1989), Hamao, 
Masulis, and Ng (1990), Lin, Engle, and Ito (1994), Peiró, Quesada, and Uriel (1998), Ng 
(2000)). International stock markets are strongly correlated with the US market and past US 
stock returns affect present returns on other markets. Lagged spillovers are particularly 
interesting to investigate, because stock markets with some delay assimilate important news 
from other markets. The most likely reasons may be inefficiencies of international stock 
markets, different opening hours on those markets, and non-synchronous trading (Cheung and 
Ng (1996), Peiró, Quesada, and Uriel (1998)). Analyzing lead-lag effects enables investors to 
learn about the structure and direction of financial spillovers, which is important for effective 
portfolio allocation and risk management (e.g., Ang and Bekaert (2002, 2004)). 
Second, investigations in the field of stock market linkages suggest that stock returns 
are more volatile and more correlated with each other during turbulent periods compared to 
tranquil periods (King and Wadhwani (1990), Karolyi and Stulz (1996), Longin and Solnik 
(2001), Forbes and Rigobon (2002)). A rising positive correlation may suggest a decrease of 
capital diversification opportunities across markets during financial crises (Ang and Bekaert 
(2002), Bekaert and Harvey (2003)). The differences in financial spillovers during calm and 
turmoil periods are of special interest to agents who want to learn about the chance of having a 
crisis at the home market today, when there was a negative shock to another market yesterday. 
International investors can adjust their portfolio strategies to a changing structure of spillovers 
in different regimes. Moreover, financial market regulators are concerned about the 
vulnerability of home capital markets to international crises. 
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Despite the importance of both aspects only a few studies investigate changes in lead-
lag effects of financial spillovers during calm periods and financial crises. The scarce findings 
suggest that spillovers from one market to other markets are found to be stronger when the 
former market is hit by some negative shock (Malliaris and Urrutia (1992), Sola, Spagnolo, 
and Spagnolo (2002), Chen, Chiang, and So (2003), Climent and Meneu (2003), Sander and 
Kleimeier (2003)). This paper develops a Markov-switching framework for testing the lead-lag 
dependences that are allowed to be asymmetric with respect to stock markets’ states of calm or 
crisis. 
For example, our testing framework enables us to examine whether stock markets 
undergoing financial distress are still vulnerable to spillovers from other markets. Finding an 
answer to this issue may help in analyzing sources of financial crises. Stronger spillovers to 
turmoil stock markets could point to contagion as the main source of crises, while weaker 
spillovers could suggest an individual character of financial distress. 
Most studies analyzing spillovers between stock markets during tranquil and crisis 
times do not take into account that the two analyzed markets can be in two different regimes of 
crisis or calm, i.e., the stock market following the other market can be in the state of crisis 
independently of the state of the leading market. Another drawback of some studies is the ad 
hoc method used to identify crisis and calm periods (e.g., Malliaris and Urrutia (1992), Forbes 
and Rigobon (2002), Dungey and Zhumabekova (2001)). For example, in Chen, Chiang, and 
So (2003) the two regimes are explicitly defined as past stock returns exceeding (or falling 
below) an estimated threshold level. Moreover, earlier studies usually concentrate on specific 
events. 
In this paper, we consider spillover effects from the US stock market to three major 
markets in Japan, the UK, and Germany over the period from 1984 to 2003 as well as sub-
samples. We compare spillover effects during tranquil and turbulent periods and address the 
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problems expressed above by extending the Markov switching model proposed by Phillips 
(1991). Phillips developed a bivariate Markov switching model to evaluate the transmission of 
business cycles between countries. Sola, Spagnolo, and Spagnolo (2002) applied this approach 
in the framework of financial markets to test their specific hypothesis of contagion across stock 
markets during the Asian crisis in 1997. Edwards and Susmel (2001) added lagged returns and 
conditional autoregressive heteroscedasticity into the model specification and investigated tests 
of independence and co-movements between international emerging stock markets in 1990s. 
More recently, Białkowski and Serwa (2005) proposed tests for causality between stock 
markets in a Markov switching framework. 
We construct a model of stock index returns for two markets analogous to the one 
proposed by Sola, Spagnolo, and Spagnolo (2002) and develop a test to investigate the 
hypotheses that, first, one market leads the other in both turmoil and tranquil periods and, 
second, one market leads the other only when the latter is already in a turmoil (calm) period. In 
this way we extend the methodology proposed by Edwards and Susmel (2001), Sola, Spangolo, 
and Spagnolo (2002), and Białkowski and Serwa (2005), used to test financial contagion, 
causality, and independence by applying tests for asymmetric financial spillovers in a Markov 
switching framework (see also Ravn and Sola (1995), Hamilton and Lin (1996), Psaradakis, 
Ravn, and Sola (2004)). 
Our testing procedure has several advantages over other approaches to analyze the 
transmission of spillovers across stock markets. First, for each stock market it differentiates 
between calm and turbulent regimes. Thus, the method allows for a measurement of spillovers 
depending on the state of the market. The empirical literature suggests that multi-regime 
switching models of stock returns perform better than one-regime models (Cecchetti, Lam, and 
Mark (1990), Turner, Stratz, and Nelson (1990), Rydén, Teräsvirta, and Åsbrink (1998), Ang 
and Bekaert (2002)). Second, our procedure does not require an ad hoc identification of periods 
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to examine spillovers between stock markets. Instead it estimates the probabilities of being in 
the crisis in a joint framework with all parameters of the model. Third, correlation and 
regression measures often fail to explore non-linear relations between variables. We offer a test 
on cross-market spillovers which does not depend on a specific linear or non-linear structure of 
linkages between stock returns. Fourth, Sola, Spagnolo, and Spagnolo (2002) provide a test of 
extreme spillovers, which they call a test of contagion. Our test is more flexible than the one 
applied there, since it examines a wider range of possible spillovers between the stock markets. 
Finally, as an additional characteristics, most of the studies do not explicitly define 
spillovers between stock markets. In this paper, we provide a definition of one market leading 
other market that allows for distinguishing between lead-lag relations in calm and turbulent 
periods. This definition is consistent with the notion of causality, while in the context of 
financial crises it suits well the concept of contagion. To distinguish between extreme cases of 
spillovers we provide explicit definitions of independence (no spillovers) and contagion, which 
are in line with Sola, Spagnolo, and Spagnolo (2002), and compare the empirical results for 
tests based on those definitions. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the 
model based on the idea of Phillips (1991) to estimate stock index returns on two markets. 
Section 3 discusses our definitions of financial spillovers and discusses the tests for 
dependencies between the markets. Data and empirical results on spillovers from the US stock 
market to the Japanese, British, and German stock market are presented in section 4. Section 5 
summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Modeling index returns on two markets 
Our econometrical starting point is a Markov switching model of index returns on two 
markets. Let Z  be the vector ] ,[ ′YX , where { }NtxX t ∈=   ,  and { }NtyY t ∈=   ,  are the two 
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time series that can be interpreted as stock market index returns on two separate markets. Both 
index returns are allowed to enter one of the two complementary states of "crisis" and "calm" 
periods. Using all four combinations of these states we construct a Markov process with four 
regimes and we use the index  to denote these regimes. "s X  and Y  are in the calm states" 
defines the first regime . ")1( =s X  is in the calm state and Y  is in the crisis state" denotes the 
second one . The third regime indicates that ")2( =s X  is in the crisis state and Y  is in the 
calm state" . ")3( =s X  and Y  are in the crisis states" defines the fourth regime ( . )4=s
At each point in time, the state  is determined by an unobservable Markov chain. The 
dynamics of the Markov chain are described by a 
s
44×  transition matrix P : 
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
=
44434241
34333231
24232221
14131211
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
P
p
p
p
p
, (1) 
where  denotes the probability of changing the state from i  to ijp j . Assume that the 12×  
vector  is driven by the four-state regime switching process: ],[ ′= ttt yxz
tsst uz Θ+= µ , (2) 
where  is a Gaussian process with zero mean and positive-definite covariance matrix tu Σ . The 
vector  is generated by the mixture of normal distributions with the mean tz sµ  and the 
covariance matrix , both depending on the state : sΣ s
),(~)(| sstt Nssz Σ= µ  (3) 
and: 
sss ΣΘΘ′=Σ  (4) 
for . Thus, the model is called a (four-state) Markov switching mixture of normal 
distributions and it consists of 32 independent parameters, namely two parameters of means for 
each state, three independent parameters from 
4 ,3 ,2 ,1=s
sΣ  for each state, and twelve independent 
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parameters from the transition matrix P . In this model no constraints are imposed on the 
parameters of means, variances, correlations, and parameters from the transition matrix P . 
Economists highlight the significance of changes in return volatility during crisis 
periods. The high variance of index returns characterizes turmoil periods and the low variance 
characterizes tranquil periods. Additionally, the correlation coefficients between returns on 
different markets tend to increase when one of the markets enters the crisis regime (e.g. King 
and Wadhwani (1990), Karolyi and Stulz (1996), Longin and Solnik (2001), Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002)). However, some authors define crisis regimes as low average returns 
observed over longer periods or appearance of unusually low returns (Longin and Solnik 
(2001), Chen, Chiang, and So (2003), Mishkin and White (2003), Hartmann, Straetmans, and 
de Vries (2004)). 
Therefore, in our paper we highlight the importance of changes in the variance and 
correlation by allowing them to take different values in all four regimes. Moreover, we restrict 
the parameter space by assuming that the mean of returns on each market switches between its 
high and low value depending on the state of this market. The high value of mean describes a 
market in the calm regime and the low value of mean describes a market in the crisis regime. 
We expect low mean returns, high variances, and high correlation when both markets are in the 
crisis regime and high means, low variances, and low correlation when both markets are in the 
tranquil regime. The parameter space for means, variances, and correlations between returns on 
the two markets is defined as follows: 
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and: 
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{ }XYCCsXYCTsXYTCsXYTTs ρρρρρρρρρ ===== ==== 4321 ,,, .    (5c) 
Symbols T , , and  denote the state of tranquility on the respective market (the numbers 
are to distinguish between different values of a particular parameter in different regimes). 
Symbols , , and  denote the crisis state. The transition matrix remains unconstrained, 
therefore we call this model a "general" or "unconstrained" model. 
1T 2T
C 1C 2C
In order to examine how our model fits the data we use several tests proposed by 
Breunig, Najarian, and Pagan (2003). We compare the means, variances, and peaks of the 
empirical distributions of the original data and the data simulated from our model. 
Additionally, we investigate a "leverage effect" for both sets of data. The leverage effect is a 
common feature of stock returns indicating higher volatility of returns when past returns are 
negative (e.g. Black (1976), Engle and Ng (1993)). We find that our models are consistent with 
the original data in all cases and for all tests. Detailed results are presented in Appendix. 
 
3. Independence, Spillovers, and Contagion 
In addition to the Markov switching model we need definitions of regime-
independence, contagion and spillovers. These definitions enable us to assess the strength of 
shock transmission between the markets during stable and turmoil periods. Moreover, the 
definitions provide us the basis to distinguish between spillovers when one of the markets is in 
the crisis or in the calm state. We also describe the tests for no spillovers and contagion and 
propose our testing procedures to analyze the hypotheses of, first, one market leading the other 
during calm periods and, second, one market leading the other during crisis periods. The null 
hypothesis is that a spillover effect exists between the markets in both periods. 
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3.1 Two extremes: contagion and independence 
There exist several definitions of contagion and methods to test them. The definitions 
presented in this paper are strongly related to the original description of contagion discussed in 
Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) (Pericoli and Sbracia (2003), Hartmann, Straetmans, 
and de Vries (2004), and Fontaine (2005) among others). Contagion is defined there as "a 
significant increase in the probability of a crisis in one country, conditional on a crisis 
occurring in another country". Sola, Spagnolo, and Spagnolo (2002) suggested an extreme case 
of this definition, where the probability of having a crisis at home equals one if the crisis hits 
another market. We explore their methodology (Definitions 1 and 2) and propose a modest 
alternative that suits more closely the description presented above (Definition 3). 
Another branch of studies explore changes in the structure of inter-market linkages, i.e. 
“shift-contagion” hypothesis (Forbes and Rigobon (2001)). They usually analyze changes in 
the correlation of international stock returns (e.g. King and Wadhawani (1990), Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002), Pericoli and Sbracia (2003)) or define contagion as excessive spillovers from 
one market into another during turbulent periods beyond structural linkages between these 
markets (Rigobon (2003)). Although we concentrate on the tests of financial spillovers based 
on the probability measures, our modeling framework provides evidence on changing 
correlation of stock returns on different markets in stable and turbulent regimes. 
Yet one more group of investigations focuses on coincidence of extreme return shocks 
across countries as evidence of contagion (Longin and Solnik (2001), Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz 
(2003), Hartman, Streatman, and de Vries (2004)). Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz express the concern 
that correlations which give equal weight to small and large shocks are not appropriate for an 
evaluation of the impact of large (possibly negative) returns. Similarly to their study, our 
model allows to evaluate the likelihood of joint occurrence of low and large returns on 
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different markets. The low and large returns are distinguished here using multiple regimes and 
changes in the correlation structure are conditional on these regimes. 
Other strategies to empirically study contagion include testing whether markets respond 
to news from other markets, analyzing the significance, size, and changes of coefficients in 
(limited dependent variable) regressions, VAR, and GARCH models, and studying inter-
market correlation after controlling for market fundamentals. Many definitions of contagion 
and their applications are surveyed in Dornbusch, Park, and Claessens (2000), Claessens and 
Forbes (2001), Billio and Pelizzon (2003), Karolyi (2003), Moser (2003), Pericoli and Sbracia 
(2003), and on World Bank web pages.  
Definition 1. Let  be described by the Markov switching model introduced 
above. 
]  [ ′= YXZ
Y  is said to be "regime-independent" of X  if the event that Y  enters the state i  at time 
 is independent of the present and past states of t X , where  is the crisis or calm regime in 
our Markov switching model. 
i
Sola, Spagnolo, and Spangolo (2002) employ the definition of regime-independence of 
X  and Y  to test for contagious spillovers between financial markets. In case Y  and X  are 
regime-independent the following restrictions are imposed on the transition matrix P : 
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, (6) 
where  denotes the probability of entering the state Qijπ j  by the time series Q  at time t  when 
it was in the state i  at time . , 1−t },{ YXQ∈ },{, CTji ∈ , and T  and C  denote the calm and 
crisis regimes, respectively. It should be noted that regime-independence does not imply 
independence of X  and Y , since they are still allowed to be correlated with each other. 
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Definition 2. Contagion from X  to Y  is present when the probability that Y  enters the 
state  at time  conditional on the information that i t X  was in this state at time  is equal 
one, where  denotes the crisis or calm regime in our Markov switching model. 
1−t
i
According to this definition the stock index return Y  has to enter a specific regime, e.g. 
the crisis regime, if the stock index return X  was there one period earlier. Thus, the sum of 
conditional probabilities  and  in the transition matrix 11p 13p P  can be formulated as: 
11311 =+ pp . (7) 
Calm and crisis are complementary events and we can express the sum of the probabilities as: 
) calm in     calm in   |  calm in  Pr( 111311 −−=+ ttt YandXYpp  (8) 
because: 
) calm in   and  calm in   |  calm in   and  calm in  Pr( 1111 −−= tttt YXYXp , (9) 
) calm in   and  calm in   |  calm in   and  crisis in  Pr( 1113 −−= tttt YXYXp . (10) 
Analogously, the other constraints on the transition matrix are: 
12321 =+ pp , (11) 
13432 =+ pp , (12) 
14442 =+ pp  (13) 
and the transition matrix P  takes on the form: 
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
−
−
−
−
=
4242
3232
2121
1111
100
100
010
010
pp
pp
pp
pp
P . (14) 
Our definition of contagion is a less restrictive version of the one put forward by Sola, 
Spagnolo, and Spagnolo (2002) and is inspired by the work of Phillips (1991). Sola, Spagnolo, 
and Spagnolo set additional constraints assuming that 2111 pp =  and , i.e. the 
probability that both markets, 
4232 pp =
X  and Y , enter the crisis or the calm regime does no depend on 
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the regime of Y  in the previous period. Thus, the past realizations of Y  do not influence X  
when there is contagion from X  to Y . Such an additional restriction has been criticized in the 
financial contagion literature due to the possibility of an estimation bias coming from 
overlooking the bi-directional transmission of shocks between the markets (Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002), Billio and Pelizzon (2003), Moser (2003), Rigobon (2003)). 
Additionally, the idea of contagion is usually associated with financial crises spilling 
over from one market to other markets. One can expect that one market infects the other 
market only when it is in the crisis regime. Such a definition of "contagion in the crisis regime" 
corresponds to the transition matrix: 
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
−
−=
4242
3232
24232221
11
0
0
p
p 141312
10
10
pp
pp
ppp
ppp
P . (15) 
The important characteristics of these definitions are identification of direction of 
contagion and financial spillovers from one market to another occurring with a lag, which 
allows for identification of delays in information or capital flows between markets (Climent 
and Meneu (2003), Sander and Kleimeier (2003)).  
 
3.2 Identifying spillovers 
Our contagion definitions in the spirit of Sola, Spagnolo, and Spagnolo (2002) are very 
restrictive. Even rejecting them does not imply that one market does not lead the other (Ravn 
and Sola (1995)). Therefore, we propose a weaker form of inter-market dependency that fits 
well the idea of increased probability of a crisis at home, given the crisis occurred abroad and 
is based on the notion of financial spillovers and causality (e.g., Geweke (1984)). 
In this study, we use the expressions “spillovers” and “causality” interchangeably, 
because the original idea of Granger (1969, 1980) causality is translated into the Markov 
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switching framework (Białkowski and Serwa (2005)) and causality is interpreted as evidence 
of financial spillovers between markets (Hamao, Masulis, and Ng (1990), Climent and Meneu 
(2003), among others). In contrast to previous studies exploring causality in mean (e.g., 
Malliaris and Urrutia (1992)) or causality in volatility (Cheung and Ng (1996)), this approach 
investigates causality in probability of entering the specific state by market Y , conditional on 
past information from markets X  and Y . 
Definition 3. X  leads Y  by one period if the magnitude of the probability that Y  enters 
the state i  at time  depends on whether t X  was in the state j  at time , where i  and 1−t j  
are allowed to be the crisis or calm regimes in our Markov switching model. 
We understand Granger causality from X to Y as evidence of the difference in 
conditional probabilities of Y  entering the state , when i X  was in the calm state or in the 
crisis state at time , respectively. The case of 1−t X  leading Y  is interpreted in the context of 
inter-market linkages as a presence of financial spillovers from one market to the other. For 
example, the definition of spillovers comprises the situation when the probability of one 
market entering the crisis regime depends not only on whether this market was in the state of 
crisis one period earlier, but also on whether the other market was there in the previous period: 
crisis) in   and  crisis in  |  crisis in Pr( 11 −− ttt YXY  
crisis) in   and  calm in  |  crisis in Pr( 11 −−≠ ttt YXY , (16) 
which can be expressed in terms of parameters from the transition matrix P  as: 
44422422 pppp +≠+ . (17) 
Analogously, the following inequalities must be valid if X  leads Y  in all regimes: 
33311311 pppp +≠+ , (18) 
43412321 pppp +≠+ , (19) 
34321412 pppp +≠+ , (20) 
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44422422 pppp +≠+ . (21) 
If one assumes that no spillovers exist between the markets in any regimes, the inequalities 
(18) to (21) become equalities and then the transition matrix P  is defined as: 
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
−+−+
−+−+=
44434241
3431131134141231
2421434124444221
14131211
pppp
pppppppp
pppppppp
pppp
P . (22) 
It can be shown that the constraint 24444222 pppp −+=  is equivalent to 21434123 pppp −+=  
and that the constraint 34141232 pppp −+=  is equivalent to 31131133 pppp −+= . Therefore, 
the parameters  and  can be set unconstrained in the estimation process. 23p 33p
Additionally, one can assume that no spillovers from X  to Y  will be present at time 
 in case 1+t Y  is in the crisis state at time . For example, the influence of the US market on 
the Japanese market could strongly diminish, when the Japanese market is hit by the strong 
internal crisis. In this case the transition matrix 
t
P  will be defined as follows: 
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
−+−+=
44434241
3431131134141231
24232221
14131211
pppp
pppppppp
pppp
pppp
P . (23) 
Alternatively, the opposite hypothesis of no spillovers from X  to Y  when Y  is in the calm 
regime may be denoted by: 
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
−+−+=
44434241
34333231
2421434124444221
14131211
pppp
pppp
pppppppp
pppp
P . (24) 
Generally, the Markov switching approach fits well the idea of investigating spillovers 
and contagion between the markets during stable and turmoil periods. Analyzing differences 
between spillovers to calm and crisis markets is made possible by setting the suitable 
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restrictions on parameters from the transition matrix. Thus, one does not need to assume any 
specific linear or nonlinear structure of spillovers between the markets, like in autoregressive 
and ARCH models, since both contagion and spillovers are introduced directly through the 
probability measures. 
 
3.3 Testing framework 
The definitions introduced above are helpful in building tests of financial contagion, 
spillovers, and independence between the markets. The general model, described by the 
equations (1) to (5), imposes no restrictions on the transition matrix P  and assumes financial 
spillovers in both stable and turbulent regimes. It can be estimated using the standard 
Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm, similarly to Hamilton (1989, 1990). A similar 
technique is applied to estimate the contagion models, employing equations (2) to (5) and 
transition matrices (14) and (15). The models assuming regime-independence (no spillovers), 
no spillovers in crisis periods, no spillovers in calm periods, and no spillovers in any regime 
use the transition matrices (6), (23), (24), and (22), respectively. 
The models with constrained transition matrices are estimated using an algorithm 
analogous to the one described by Phillips (1991). Details are available upon request. The log-
likelihood values corresponding to the estimates are denoted by  for the general 
model with no constraint on the transition matrix 
SPILLOVERSL
P ,  for the regime-
independence model,  for the contagion model,  for the 
"contagion during crises" model, and , , 
 for the no-spillover models with the transition matrices (22), (23), and 
(24), respectively. 
CEINDEPENDENL
CONTAGIONL CRISISINCONTAGIONL    
SPILLOVERSNOL   CRISISINSPILLOVERSNOL      
CALMINSPILOVERSNOL      
 
Figure 1 about here 
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 We describe now our testing procedure used to explore possible interdependencies 
between capital markets. In Figure 1 the testing hypotheses are ordered in the general-to-
specific sequence. Exceptions are Hypotheses 3a and 3b, which are not nested in Hypothesis 2. 
We start with testing the null hypothesis assuming that there is contagion from X  to Y  when 
both markets are in the crisis regime (Hypothesis 1) against the alternative of no contagion. 
Under the null hypothesis, the likelihood ratio statistic: 
)4(~)(2 2   χCRISISINCONTAGIONSPILLOVERS LLLR −=  (25) 
has the standard asymptotic  distribution with four degrees of freedom. If the null 
hypothesis can be accepted, we continue with testing the hypothesis that contagion exists in 
both calm and crisis regimes (Hypothesis 2). We use the likelihood ratio statistic: 
2χ
)8(~)(2 2χCONTAGIONSPILLOVERS LLLR −= , (26) 
which has the asymptotic  distribution with eight degrees of freedom (Sola, Spagnolo, and 
Spagnolo (2002)). 
2χ
If the Hypothesis 1 is rejected then no contagion exists in any regimes and we follow 
the procedure by analyzing the hypothesis that no spillovers from X  to Y  are present in cases 
Y  was in the calm regime at time 1−t  (Hypothesis 3a). Alternatively, one can test the 
hypothesis of no spillovers to Y  in case Y  was in the crisis regime at time  (Hypothesis 
3b). The respective statistics are: 
1−t
)1(~ )(2 2     χCALMINSPILLOVERSNOSPILLOVERS LLLR −=  (27) 
and: 
)1(~ )(2 2     χCRISISINSPILLOVERSNOSPILLOVERS LLLR −= . (28) 
If the both hypotheses are rejected, we conclude that financial spillovers from X  to Y  are 
present in both regimes (Hypothesis 6) and finish the procedure here. When one of the above 
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hypotheses, 3a or 3b, is accepted, we utilize the following statistic to test the Hypothesis 4 of 
no spillovers between the markets in any regime: 
)2(~ )(2 2   χSSPILLOVERNOSPILLOVERS LLLR −= . (29) 
When this hypothesis is accepted, we conclude that X  does not lead Y  by one period, but 
some interdependencies between stock index returns on both markets, which take place 
simultaneously (e.g. on the same day) may still be present. The probability of one market 
entering the crisis or calm regime may still depend on the regime that the other market will 
enter collaterally. To rule out such dependencies between the markets we test the hypothesis 
that markets are regime-independent (Hypothesis 5) by applying the following test statistic: 
)12(~ )(2 2χCEINDEPENDENSPILLOVERS LLLR −= . (30) 
If this hypothesis is accepted, the markets enter any regimes independently of other markets 
(Phillips (1991), Sola, Spangolo, and Spagnolo (2002)). The flexibility of the test rests on the 
fact that both markets are still allowed to be correlated in each regime. This characteristic can 
almost always be observed between financial markets (e.g., Forbes and Rigobon (2002)). 
The Markov switching models, employed by testing different hypotheses, differ only in 
parameters of the transition matrix P . In this way we avoid the problem of existence of some 
nuisance parameters that would be unidentified under the null hypotheses – a typical obstacle 
in testing multi-regime models. Therefore, our likelihood ratio statistics have their standard 
asymptotic distributions, as in Phillips (1991), Ravn and Sola (1995), and Sola, Spagnolo, and 
Spagnolo (2002). 
The testing procedure outlined here is not meant to compare spillovers between the 
markets depending on the regime of the leading market. The important feature of the 
hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 4 is that they enable us to analyze the question raised in the 
introduction, whether markets undergoing a financial distress are more or less vulnerable to 
spillovers from other markets. 
 17
 4. Data and Empirical Results 
In this section, we report the results obtained from the testing methodology outlined 
above and present the calculated probabilities of a crisis on each market when there was a 
crisis on the US market one day earlier. In our analysis we employed the standard capital 
market indices from the four largest markets in the world. The S&P 500 index represents the 
US market, the NIKKEI 225 is the index for the Japanese market, the FTSE 100 index 
corresponds to the UK market, and the DAX stands for the German index. The index returns 
are computed as first differences of logged daily closing prices from the four markets and 
cover the period from April 3, 1984 to May 30, 2003, which corresponds to 4423 observations. 
As argued in the introduction, the US is believed to be the dominating market leading 
other stock markets independently of crisis and calm periods. Therefore, in the empirical 
analysis we concentrate on spillovers from the US market to the other three markets, although 
the model applied here complies bi-directional interdependencies. Using the proposed 
algorithm, we check whether the structure of dependencies of the British, German, and 
Japanese markets on the US market should be called spillovers or rather contagion. In addition, 
we test for possible changes in the linkages between the markets during turbulent and calm 
periods. Next, we present the final models obtained from the testing procedure and compute 
the probabilities of the potential turmoil on the British, German, and Japanese market 
individually conditional on the information that the US market was in the turmoil regime one 
period earlier. 
In order to analyze whether linkages between the markets have varied over time 
independently of crisis and calm regimes, we additionally calculate all tests for three non-
overlapping sub-periods from April 3, 1984 to December 28, 1988, from January 4, 1989 to 
December 29, 1995, and from January 4, 1996 to May 30, 2003. The 1996 – 2003 sub-sample 
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is characterized by a considerable high variance of index returns on all markets in comparison 
to previous periods, which could eventually influence the general results. We also divide the 
rest of the time series into the two sub-periods, where the 1989 – 1995 interval is a relatively 
stable period and the 1984 – 1988 period comprises the great crash of the 1987 that has been 
found to influence spillovers from the US to other markets (Malliaris and Urrutia (1992)). 
Each model of the bilateral linkages between the US market and the other market is 
estimated in seven different versions. The first version corresponds to the general model with 
no restrictions on the transition matrix P , which allows for potential spillovers between the 
markets. The second model assumes that both markets are regime-independent from each other 
and the third one assumes no spillovers from the US market to the other market. The fourth 
model is estimated under the constraint that no spillovers exist when the dependent market is in 
the state of crisis and the fifth one assumes no spillovers when the dependent market is in the 
calm regime. The sixth and seventh cases are the models of contagion from the US to the other 
market and contagion only in the crisis periods, respectively. 
In Table 1 the log-likelihood values from the estimated models are presented. The 
general model has the highest likelihood value for each pair of markets, since all other models 
are restricted versions of the general model. Additionally, the "regime-independence" models 
are special cases of the "no-spillovers" models, which in turn set additional constraints in 
comparison to the "no-spillovers in crisis" and "no-spillovers in calm periods" models. Finally, 
the both "contagion" models are restricted forms of the general model. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
To distinguish which models are statistically justified and which are too restrictive we 
employ the likelihood ratio statistics described in the previous section. All the results from our 
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testing procedure are presented in Table 2. For all pairs of markets, the hypotheses of 
contagion and a weaker hypothesis of contagion in the crisis regime is rejected, which 
corresponds to the result of Sola, Spagnolo, and Spangolo (2002). Hence, we continue the 
procedure by testing the null hypotheses of no spillovers in crisis periods, no spillovers in calm 
periods, and no spillovers in any regimes. All of them are also rejected and we interpret these 
results as existence of spillovers from the US to the Japanese, British, and German markets 
independently of whether these latter markets are in crisis or calm regimes. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
It is interesting to note that the test statistics for the hypothesis of no spillovers during 
crises always have higher values than the statistics for the hypothesis of no spillovers during 
calm periods. Assuming no spillovers when the Japanese, British, and German markets are in 
crisis regimes would be a more likely choice than assuming no spillovers in calm regimes. 
However, these both hypotheses, and models, are rejected as too restrictive. Finally, the 
regime-independence is also rejected in all cases, which confirms that some interdependencies 
are present between the US and other markets. 
One explanation for the evidence of spillovers but no evidence of contagion could be 
that most information from the US markets spills over to the British and German markets 
already on the same day due to nonsynchronous, overlapping trading hours on the US and 
European stock exchanges. Thus, as a robustness check, we calculated all tests for these stock 
markets with 24-hour stock returns, synchronized by using index values at 4 p.m. Greenwich 
Mean Time for each day. The data are obtained from the Datastream database for the period 
from August 30, 1990 to May 30, 2003. We received qualitatively the same results. The 
empirical findings are not reported but available on request. 
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According to our results the best models of dependencies between the markets are the 
general unconstrained models allowing for spillovers in all regimes, but not restricting these 
spillovers only to contagion effects. We present the parameters of these final models in Table 
3. It is important that all the models match the main empirical patterns found on international 
capital markets. First, the regime with low average index returns on both markets is 
characterized by higher volatility of index returns than the regime with both markets in calm 
periods. It is interesting to note that the highest (lowest) volatilities are always obtained in the 
same regime for both markets. Moreover, in each model the regime with highest volatilities on 
the two markets is the one with one market in the state of crisis and the other market in the 
state of calm. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Second, when both markets are in the crisis regime they become more correlated with 
each other than when they are in their calm regimes (e.g., Longin and Solnik (2001), Forbes 
and Rigobon (2002)). Finally, from the elements of the transition matrices it can be observed 
that the probability of staying in the same regime is always highest for all regimes and all 
estimated models. This result can be interpreted as evidence of persistence of high (low) 
volatility in stock market index returns in line with the well-known characteristics of 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity in stock index returns (e.g., Rydén, Teräsvirta, 
and Åsbrink (1998)). Against the background of these findings ARCH effects can at least 
partially be explained by the evidence of persistent calm and turbulent regimes. Significant 
causality from the US market implies that the persistence of the US market volatility also 
affects the intensity of ARCH effects on other developed markets. 
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Moreover, comparing the estimated transition matrices in Table 3 with constraints 
proposed in equations (14) and (15) leads to the conclusion that the high values of the 
parameters  and , which can be interpreted as indicators of persistence of the states 2 
and 3, are main reasons for rejecting both contagion hypotheses in the spirit of Sola, Spagnolo, 
and Spagnolo (2002). 
22p 33p
Our results, suggesting that the spillovers hypothesis is valid, are consistent with the 
literature defining contagion as an increase in the probability of having a crisis at home when 
there is a crisis on the other market. Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) and Hartmann, 
Streatmans, and de Vries (2004) also find evidence of contagion when they apply the same 
definition of contagion. The evidence of causality from the US market to other developed 
markets, interpreted as inter-market financial spillovers, is in line with other empirical studies 
finding causation effects in returns and volatility from the US market (Eun and Shim (1989), 
Hamao, Masulis, and Ng (1990), Malliaris and Urrutia (1992), Lin, Engle, and Ito (1994), Ng 
(2000), Climent and Meneu (2003), Sander and Kleimeier (2003)). 
Having estimated transition matrices for each model we are able to compute the 
probabilities of some market entering the state of crisis or calm, conditional on the information 
that this market and the US market were in their respective states yesterday. These findings are 
useful in explaining why it is causality but not contagion that usually characterizes inter-
market relationships. The empirical results are also of special importance for international 
investors and the great advantage of the model is that they can be obtained directly using 
standard computations on the elements of the transition matrix. We additionally provide 
findings on the probability of one market entering the crisis (calm) regime conditional on the 
state of the US market one day earlier. The empirical results are presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 about here 
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 The main conclusion from the calculated probabilities is that entering one regime by the 
market is most likely and even close to one when this market and the US market were in the 
same regime one period earlier. If the US market was not in that regime one period earlier then 
the probability of entering the regime by the other market drops in almost all cases. The 
probability is close to zero that the market enters the state of calm (crisis) when the US market 
and this respective market were in the opposite regime one period earlier. This finding 
illustrates how the past information about the US market spills over to other mature markets on 
the next day. Furthermore, we are able to forecast the future state of the market more 
accurately having the information about the present state of both markets rather than having the 
information only about the US market. This in turn explains why the hypothesis of contagion is 
rejected in our analyses. The past information about each market influences its present 
performance in such a way that it does not always follow the state of the US market. 
We continue the analysis with studying the relations between the markets in the 
selected three non-overlapping sub-samples to learn how the dependencies between 
international capital markets change over time. The results from testing all hypotheses of 
contagion, spillovers, and regime-independence are presented in Table 5. The general findings 
from this exercise are that the US leads Japan, the UK and Germany, but the patterns of 
spillovers from the US to those markets vary over time (Rydén, Teräsvirta, and Åsbrink 
(1998)). 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
Some evidence of asymmetry in spillover effects between calm and crisis regimes is 
present in the investigated sub-samples. In the 1984 – 1988 period we can accept the 
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hypothesis that the S&P 500 index returns do not lead the DAX and NIKKEI 225 index returns 
when the latter indices are in the calm regimes. Similarly, from 1996 to 2003 returns on the 
Japanese market follow the US market returns only in the state of crisis and any spillover 
effects to Japan are quite weak in this period. The lack of spillovers in any regime to the UK is 
accepted in the 1989 – 1995 sub-sample. Since regime-independence is also rejected there, we 
interpret this result as evidence of the inter-dependencies between the US and UK capital 
markets, which take place without delay. One possible explanation for the lack of spillovers to 
the UK from the US could be the ERM currency crisis of 1992 that affected most strongly the 
British market. In the most recent period 1996 – 2003, S&P 500 index returns lead very 
strongly the DAX returns and one can observe the contagion effect when the German index is 
in the crisis regime. Likely reasons for this contagion effect could be recent shocks which took 
place on the US market and spread to other markets after the terrorist attack on September 11 
and after the burst of the "dot.com" bubble. In all other cases there are significant spillovers 
from the US to the other markets independently of the crisis and calm regimes. 
From Table 5 one can observe that spillovers between capital markets evolve over time 
independently of changing regimes. There are naturally some factors other than changing states 
of the markets which can influence the strength of spillovers and future applications may 
extend the proposed models by introducing additional elements or varying parameters. 
Nevertheless, our results show that spillovers between the four big stock capital markets exist 
in all periods. 
There is less evidence of spillovers to the markets in the calm regime than to the stock 
markets which are in the crisis regime in the sub-periods. This finding could indicate that the 
market not involved in some international crash often remains resistant to spillovers from the 
US stock market. As soon as it allows for the high volatility regime at home it becomes more 
 24
vulnerable to the influence of the US market, because concerned investors observe more 
carefully the performance of the US market in the context of the international turmoil. 
This could also suggest that in some periods the analyzed markets are robust to any 
contagion from the US market, because they enter crisis regimes independently of the US 
market or simultaneously with the US market. If the latter case was true, then the direction of 
contagion would be toward the US market rather than from the US market due to possible 
crises on other not investigated markets that could cause the US market and other analyzed 
markets to enter the crisis regime in the same time. 
Additionally, the US market has less influence on European and Asian markets on the 
same day because of different trading hours on the stock exchanges in Asia, Europe, and 
America. American stock markets open and close after the European and Asian markets each 
day, although some trading hours overlap. In contrast, European and Asian stock index returns 
may influence the American index returns on the same day (e.g., Cheung and Ng (1996)). 
Thus, some modifications in data are required to test for spillovers from European or Asian 
markets to the US market. However, we leave this issue for further research. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this article, we investigate international financial spillovers from the US stock 
market to the Japanese, British, and German markets. We introduce a statistical framework to 
deal with the problem of asymmetries in financial spillovers in calm and turbulent regimes. 
Spillovers and contagion to stock markets during crisis and calm periods are explicitly defined 
and new tests are proposed to distinguish between financial spillovers in crisis and calm 
regimes. 
Our testing framework is capable of distinguishing between different types of relations 
connecting two stock markets, i.e., contagion, spillovers, and independence. Thus, we compare 
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the results from testing financial spillovers with outcomes from the tests of contagion and 
independence and obtain evidence that the Japanese, British, and German stock markets are 
dependent on the past performance of the US market, but encounter almost no indication of 
contagion in the spirit of Sola, Spagnolo, and Spangolo (2002). We find that spillovers taking 
place when the dependent markets are in the crisis regime are more frequent than spillovers to 
the markets in the state of calm, which is in line with the results of Chen, Chiang, and So 
(2003). This result suggests that financial crashes on the US market do not always directly 
cause turmoil on the Japanese, British, and German stock markets. However, the crashes on the 
US market increase the probability of a crisis on the three other mature markets, which is in 
line with the hypothesis of contagious crises introduced by Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz 
(1996). The finding that less spillovers from the US to other stock markets during calm relative 
to crisis periods has an implication for an international portfolio diversification strategy due to 
its lower benefits in turbulent regimes. 
Additionally, we present the probabilities for the Japanese, British, and German stock 
markets individually entering the states of calm and crisis periods, conditional on the 
information about the past performance of those markets and the US market. Information from 
both markets is found to be relevant for efficient forecasting of future stock market index 
returns on those markets, therefore further research could incorporate our framework in testing 
for diversification benefits from asset allocation on international markets, as in Ang and 
Bekaert (2002, 2004). 
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Table 1: Log-likelihood Values of the Estimated Markov Switching Models 
 
S&P 500 
and 
NIKKEI 225 
S&P 500 
and 
FTSE 100 
S&P 500 
and 
DAX 
SPILLOVERSL  – 13222.11 – 11780.00 – 12957.88 
CRISISINNSL    – 13238.43 – 11834.50 – 12988.96 
PROSPERITYINNSL    – 13235.73 – 11821.00 – 12979.50 
NSL  – 13247.70 – 11863.07 – 13006.06 
CEINDEPENDENL  – 13390.40 – 11858.60 – 13062.95 
CONTAGIONL  – 13386.00 – 11840.58 – 13069.87 
CRISISINCONTAGIONL     – 13331.62 – 11816.13 – 13003.45 
Note: The log-likelihood values corresponding with the estimates are 
denoted by  for the general model,  for the 
independence model,  for the contagion model, 
 for the "contagion during crises" model, and , 
,  for the no-spillover models with the 
transition matrices (23), (24), and (22), respectively. 
SPILLOVERSL CEINDEPENDENL
CONTAGIONL
CRISISINCONTAGIONL    NSL
CRISISINNSL   PROSPERITYINNSL   
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Table 2: Tests of Linkages between the Markets 
Null hypothesis 
S&P 500 
and 
NIKKEI 225 
S&P 500 
and 
FTSE 100 
S&P 500 
and 
DAX 
Regime-
independence 336.58** 157.20** 210.14** 
No spillovers 
during calm   26.64**   82.00**   43.24** 
No spillovers 
during crises   33.24** 109.00**   62.16** 
No spillovers at 
any regimes   51.18** 127.19**   96.36** 
Contagion 327.78** 121.16** 223.98** 
Contagion during 
crises 219.02**   72.26**   91.14** 
Note: * and ** denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 3: Final Models of Dependencies between the Markets 
State of X State of  Y
Xµ  
(%) 
Xσ  
(%) 
Yµ  
(%) 
Yσ  
(%) 
),( YXcorr   Transition matrix P  
S&P 500             DAX
calm       Calm 0.080 (0.007) 
0.670 
(0.023) 
0.107 
(0.013) 
0.845 
(0.035) 
0.175 
(0.066) 0.982 0.002 0.001 0.015
calm       
       
       
            
crisis 0.080 (0.007) 
5.944 
(1.891) 
0.019 
(0.001) 
4.994 
(1.044) 
0.315 
(0.092) 0.000 0.566 0.043 0.391
crisis calm 0.037 (0.004) 
1.842 
(0.495) 
0.107 
(0.013) 
3.007 
(0.747) 
0.684 
(0.171) 0.000 0.000 0.972 0.028
crisis crisis 0.037 (0.004) 
 
1.127 
(0.297) 
0.019 
(0.001) 
1.493 
(0.444) 
0.378 
(0.092) 0.025 0.007 0.005 0.962
S&P 500 FTSE 100
calm       calm 0.082 (0.006) 
0.666 
(0.084) 
0.065 
(0.005) 
0.732 
(0.091) 
0.315 
(0.024) 0.978 0.000 0.022 0.000
calm       
       
       
          
crisis 0.082 (0.006) 
8.717 
(2.110) 
– 0.088 
(0.007) 
5.250 
(1.417) 
0.493 
(0.067) 0.000 0.513 0.382 0.105
crisis calm – 0.064 (0.009) 
1.222 
(0.195) 
0.065 
(0.005) 
1.138 
(0.214) 
0.444 
(0.072) 0.035 0.005 0.953 0.007
crisis Crisis – 0.064 (0.009) 
1.946 
(0.280) 
– 0.088 
(0.007) 
2.174 
(0.540) 
0.517 
(0.091) 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.963
S&P 500 NIKKEI 225 
calm       calm 0.099 (0.010) 
0.738 
(0.135) 
0.099 
(0.095) 
0.640 
(0.140) 
0.066 
(0.009) 0.970 0.014 0.000 0.016
calm       
       
       
crisis    0.099 (0.010) 
0.637 
(0.102) 
– 0.027 
(0.012) 
1.659 
(0.342) 
0.154 
(0.033) 0.016 0.969 0.008 0.007
crisis calm – 0.005 (0.002) 
3.066 
(0.980) 
0.099 
(0.095) 
3.289 
(0.917) 
0.142 
(0.024) 0.000 0.057 0.850 0.092
crisis crisis – 0.005 (0.002) 
1.234 
(0.123) 
– 0.027 
(0.012) 
1.363 
(0.202) 
0.176 
(0.053) 0.017 0.000 0.018 0.965
Note: For further explanations see text.
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Table 4: Probability of a Crisis or Calm Today and the Information from Yesterday 
X  represents the S&P 500 index returns and  represents: Y NIKKEI 225 FTSE 100 DAX 
Probabilities conditional on the information from  and  1−tX 1−tY
) calmin    and  calmin    |  calmin   Pr( 11 −− ttt XYY  0.970 1.000 0.983 
) crisisin    and  calmin    |  calmin   Pr( 11 −− ttt XYY  0.850 0.988 0.972 
) calmin    and  crisisin    |  calmin   Pr( 11 −− ttt XYY  0.024 0.382 0.043 
) crisisin    and  crisisin    |  calmin   Pr( 11 −− ttt XYY  0.035 0.037 0.030 
) calmin    and  calmin    |  crisisin   Pr( 11 −− ttt XYY  0.030 0.000 0.017 
) crisisin    and  calmin    |  crisisin   Pr( 11 −− ttt XYY  0.150 0.012 0.028 
) calmin    and  crisisin    |  crisisin   Pr( 11 −− ttt XYY  0.976 0.618 0.957 
) crisis in   and  crisis in   |  crisis in  Pr( 11 −− ttt XYY  0.965 0.963 0.970 
Probabilities conditional only on the information from  1−tX
) calmin     |    calmin   Pr( 1−tt XY  0.564 0.929 0.967 
) crisisin     |    calmin   Pr( 1−tt XY  0.149 0.206 0.231 
) calmin     |    crisisin   Pr( 1−tt XY  0.436 0.071 0.033 
) crisisin     |    crisisin   Pr( 1−tt XY  0.851 0.794 0.769 
Note: For further explanations see text. 
 34
Table 5: Tests of Linkages between the Markets in Sub-Samples 
 
Sub-periods Null hypothesis 
S&P 500 
and 
NIKKEI 225
S&P 500 
and 
FTSE 100 
S&P 500 
and 
DAX 
1984/04/03 – 1988/12/28 Regime-independence   93.18**   53.12**   63.24** 
 No spillovers during calm 3.20     7.23** 0.94 
 No spillovers during crises     7.02**   15.77**   4.28* 
 No spillovers at any regimes   53.24**   25.52** 4.52 
 Contagion 105.38**   87.82**   66.42** 
 Contagion during crises   22.58**   71.88**   61.88** 
1989/01/04 – 1995/12/29 Regime-independence   61.98**   56.96**   65.00** 
 No spillovers during calm     8.96** 1.16     9.42** 
 No spillovers during crises   19.14** 2.76   24.04** 
 No spillovers at any regimes   25.98** 5.84   37.42** 
 Contagion   56.14**   71.30**   61.24** 
 Contagion during crises   40.58**   56.02**   31.52** 
1996/01/04 – 2003/05/30 Regime-independence   94.56** 112.26**   95.46** 
 No spillovers during calm 3.00   12.48**     8.82** 
 No spillovers during crises   5.86*   23.04**   11.80** 
 No spillovers at any regimes  7.76*   56.64**   20.90** 
 Contagion   41.94**   42.68**   24.04** 
 Contagion during crises   28.96**   27.30** 9.14 
Note: * and ** denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% and 1% levels. 
respectively. 
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Figure 1: The Financial Spillovers Hypotheses and Their Testing Sequence 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Specification Tests for the Estimated Markov Switching Models  
Null hypothesis 
S&P 500 ( X )  
and 
NIKKEI 225 (Y ) 
S&P 500 ( X )  
and 
FTSE 100 (Y ) 
S&P 500 ( X )  
and 
DAX (Y ) 
X
D
X
S µµ =  0.122 [0.9030] 
-0.653 
[0.5138] 
-0.293 
[0.7694] 
Y
D
Y
S µµ =  -0.420 [0.6748] 
0.670  
[0.5026] 
-0.498 
[0.6182] 
X
D
X
S σσ =  1.02 [0.5191] 
0.99 
[0.7629] 
1.01 
[0.6949] 
Y
D
Y
S σσ =  0.98 [0.5769] 
1.02 
[0.4323] 
0.99 
[0.6369] 
X
D
X
S LeverageLeverage =  0.044 [0.9647] 
0.358 
[0.7203] 
0.167 
[0.8677] 
Y
D
Y
S LeverageLeverage =  0.588 [0.5568] 
0.820        
[0.4121] 
0.067 
[0.9469] 
X
D
X
S PeakPeak =  -1.036 [0.3003] 
0.316 
[0.7523] 
-0.940 
[0.3473] 
Y
D
Y
S PeakPeak =  -0.765 [0.4445] 
-0.518 
[0.6046] 
-0.936 
[0.3493] 
Note: The symbols  and  denote the original and simulated data, respectively. P-values 
are presented in squared parentheses under the values of test statistics. * and ** denote 
rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. 
D S
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